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COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE ON THE
SOUTHWEST FRONTIER: EARLY EIGHTEENTHCENTURY QING EXPANSION ON TWO FRONTS
John Herman, Virginia Commonwealth University
In 1715 Qing China (1644–1912) was forced to respond to two separate
international events, the Zunghar Mongol threat in Central Eurasia and Japan’s
decision to limit copper exports to China. The Qing response was immediate.
After receiving word that Zunghar forces had attempted to invade Hami (Qomul), a major oasis along the Silk Road, the Kangxi emperor (1654–1722, r.
1661–1722) ordered the mobilization of Qing forces along China’s northwest
frontier. The Zunghars had grown increasingly agitated by Qing attempts to
control Tibetan affairs: in 1705, Kangxi encouraged the Khoshot Mongol leader
Lazang Khan (1656?–1717) to occupy Lhasa and purge those who advocated
close relations with the Zunghars, and in 1709 the Qing official Heshou (d.
1719) took up residence in Lhasa in a show of support for Lazang Khan. The
final straw was Lazang Khan’s role in the overthrow and death of the Sixth
Dalai Lama in 1706, his selection of a new Sixth Dalai Lama, a person rumored
to be his son, and lastly his attempt in 1714 to seize the boy many Tibetans and
Mongols believed to be the reincarnation of the Sixth Dalai Lama who died
in 1706. This boy, Kelzang Gyatso (1708–57), fled his hometown (Lithang)
in the Kham region of Eastern Tibet just prior to the arrival of Lazang Khan’s
agents, and now in 1715 he was under Qing “protective custody” at the Hongshan monastery near Xining. Kangxi knew the Zunghar assault on Hami was a
prelude to a more sustained challenge to the Khoshot-Qing presence in Tibet.1
The Qing decision to mobilize forces along its northwest frontier was made
at roughly the same time Japan’s Tokugawa regime (1600–1868) announced
new regulations (Shōtoku shinrei) regarding trade at Nagasaki. One component
of these new regulations was a reduction in the amount of copper Chinese
merchants could purchase from Japan. The Qing state’s two main mints in
1
KXSL, 241:14b–15a; 263:7a–9b; Petech, China and Tibet in the Early XVIIIth Century, 14–24; Perdue,
China Marches West, 229–30.
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Beijing, the Ministry of Revenue’s Baoquanju and the Ministry of Works’
Baoyuanju, relied heavily on the annual supply of approximately 4 million jin
(1 jin equals 1.1 lbs. or 0.597 kg) of Japanese copper to cast coin, the basic currency for daily transactions in much of Qing China. China’s economy depended
on an adequate supply of coin to meet the currency needs of the people and to
maintain the coin-to-silver ratio of 1,000 coins to 1 tael (37.3 grams) of silver.2
In response to Japan’s decision in 1715, the Qing state sought to reduce the
amount of copper content in coin, persuade people to sell old copper wares to
the state, prohibit craftsmen from using copper, and even encourage people to
pay taxes in coin and copper wares instead of silver. When these measures to
ration copper usage proved insufficient, Kangxi and his successor Yongzheng
(1678–1735, r. 1723–35) moved to acquire the vast copper deposits located
almost entirely on hereditary tusi (native official) lands in southwest China (the
provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan).
This article will examine the dramatic burst in Qing expansion into two
different regions during a brief fifteen-year period (1715–30): the Kham territory of Eastern Tibet and tusi-controlled territories in neighboring Sichuan and
Yunnan provinces. Previous scholarship has described the Qing response to the
expanding Zunghar threat in Central Eurasia as having little or no relationship
with the rapid “militarization” of the southwest in the 1720s, and vice versa.3
Yet, beginning in 1715 these two events lay side by side on the emperor’s
desk and for the next fifteen years Kangxi, Yongzheng, and a multitude of
Qing officials strategized how to respond to these two events.4 In fact, during
these fifteen years many officials posted in Sichuan and Yunnan oversaw both
tasks simultaneously, and Beijing regularly rotated officials from one region
to the other because of a demonstrated expertise in frontier affairs.5 Instead of
examining this expansion as separate events, this article proposes an integrated
approach that links both the Kham region and southwest China as objects in a
Gramlich-Oka, “Shogunal Administration of Copper in the Mid-Tokugawa Period (1670–1720),” 91–97;
Iwasaki, “Genbun dōza-ki no Nagasaki kaidō to Nagasaki bōeki” (The Copper Bureau’s Role in the Transport
of Nagasaki Copper and Nagasaki Trade during the Genbun Period), 34:1–42; Nakajima, “Shinchō no dōsei
ni okeru yōdō to tendō” (Qing dynasty copper administration: Japanese copper and Yunnan copper), 161–77;
Ueda, Shinchō shihai to kahei seisaku: Shindai zenki ni okeru seisan kyōkyū seisaku no tenkai (Qing rule
and monetary policy: the development of coin supply policy during the early Qing period), 110–20.
3
On the militarization of the southwest during the Yongzheng reign, see Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the
Development of Southwest China”; Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 43–62; Feng, Yongzheng zhuan (Biography
of the Yongzheng emperor), 321–57; Weinstein, Empire and Identity in Guizhou, 43–58.
4
I certainly do not suggest that a single vision of Qing empire-building can be found on the emperor’s
desk or in his communiqués with officials. Students of empires are well aware that much of what is achieved
in the name of empire is improvised on the ground between competing interests, both public and private.
5
Guy, Qing Governors and Their Provinces, 1644–1796; Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, 64–90.
2

Collaboration and Resistance on the Southwest Frontier

79

coordinated response to two unrelated international events affecting the strategic
and economic security of Qing China.
The geographic proximity of Kham to Yunnan and Sichuan led emperor and
official alike to consider Kham and the southwest part of a larger strategic region whose diverse populations were susceptible to both instability in Tibet and
anti-Qing sentiments.6 Not only did the peoples of Kham, southwest Sichuan,
and northwest Yunnan participate in extensive trade networks along shared
borders, but Qing officials believed a certain cultural affinity existed between
these peoples. Thus, Zunghar inroads into Tibet could potentially destabilize the
entirety of Qing China’s western border, from the Yunnan-Burma border region
in the south to the Shaanxi-Sichuan-Amdo region in the north. Moreover, Wu
Sangui’s anti-Qing rebellion (1673–81) persisted as a disturbingly fresh memory
in China, and rumors of loyalists inspiring nostalgia for Ming rule preoccupied
the ruling Manchu elite and their Han Chinese sympathizers.7
Second, this integrated approach offers a fresh perspective on the historical
process of Qing imperial expansion, and specifically the role of hereditary tusi
(native official) offices in this process. Because of the strategic threat posed by
the Zunghars in 1715, Qing officials were ordered to secure allies from among
the indigenous elite in Kham and to “turn” these indigenous leaders toward
Beijing. As John Darwin recently discussed in his examination of the British
Empire, one of the most difficult tasks, but also one of the most vital, was settling the terms on which the indigenous peoples and their leaders would become
the allies, the clients or the subjects of empire. It is easily forgotten that across
much of the world empire was “made” as much if not more by the local auxiliaries that “empire-builders” recruited as by the imperialists themselves. The
result was an empire of hybrid components, conflicting traditions, and unsettled
boundaries between races and peoples: a source of constant unease as well as
extraordinary energy.8 Qing expansion into Kham depended on the cooperation
of local elites, and in this case the device to lure them toward Beijing was the
tusi office. Imperial governance was by necessity a series of compromises, and
this was especially true at the empire’s edge where the Qing state offered tusi
titles and offices, as well as vital military and financial support in return for a
declared submission to the Qing throne.
KXSL, 287:14a–b, 19a–20b, 289:4a–5a.
Guizhou tongzhi, qianshizhi (Comprehensive gazetteer of Guizhou province, a record of early events),
3:120–21, 147, 149–50. One such loyalist, Huang Ming, was allegedly a commander under Wu Sangui, and
since the war’s end in 1681 he attracted Han Chinese to his base in the remote border region where Guizhou,
Hunan, and Guangxi meet.
8
Darwin, Unfinished Empire, xii.
6
7
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As this article will show, Qing officials posted to the southwest during this
fifteen-year period were in a very peculiar position. In the last decades of the
fourteenth century, the Ming state (1368–1644) used tusi offices to extend its
authority into the southwest frontier, and now at the beginning of the eighteenth
century the process of state expansion had nearly run its course. Even before
1715 officials posted to the southwest were calling for the elimination of all
remaining tusi offices. With the events of 1715, these calls grew louder. The
tusi office, however, was the instrument of choice to expand Qing influence
into Kham. In other words, Qing officials posted to Sichuan and Yunnan during this fifteen-year period were authorized to negotiate alliances and grant tusi
offices in order to advance the Qing empire into Kham, while at the same time
they moved aggressively to eliminate the remaining tusi in order to consolidate
civilian control throughout Yunnan and Guizhou. In short, beginning in 1715
both ends of the historical spectrum Peter Perdue describes as the process of
Qing imperial expansion existed in the southwest: the initial use of tusi offices
to extend Qing influence into Kham, and the elimination of tusi in the southwest
in order to establish centralized civilian rule.9
Finally, this integrated approach allows us to consider Yongzheng activism
in the southwest not solely as an attempt to reclaim land for tax purposes or
as a moral drive to impose civilizing institutions upon the indigenous peoples.
Nor was this activism purely a reaction to the decline in copper imports from
Japan, though the scarcity in copper had much to do with enabling this activism
toward tusi in the southwest. Instead, I believe the drive to eliminate tusi offices
and erase from the landscape such hybrid features of indirect rule was part of
a larger Zunghar-inspired strategic adjustment designed to secure control over
the southwest provinces. This approach allows us to appreciate more fully why
Qing state activism in the southwest attained such extreme levels of brutality.
The Qing state veiled the elimination of tusi in the southwest by presenting
its actions as a moral obligation, a weight borne by those who ruled China.
Civilized rule guided by moral truths and an impartial legal system was Beijing’s
gift to the indigenes in the southwest, a gift the indigenes could not refuse. This
rhetoric was not exclusive to the Qing. Ming officials relied on similar rhetorical devices to replace many of the hereditary tusi offices with Chinese civil
institutions. Such rhetoric assured those officials that their task was just, even
when they seized indigene lands, confiscated indigene resources, and eliminated
indigene resistance. This rhetoric not only motivated the colonizer to act, it
also encouraged subsequent historians to erase from their narratives the more
9

Perdue, China Marches West, 310–14.
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disconcerting aspects of Qing imperial expansion. As Nicholas Dirks points out
at the end of The Scandal of Empire, “When imperial history loses any sense of
what empire meant to those who were colonized, it becomes complicit in the
history of empire itself.”10 Given the brutality of what transpired in Yunnan and
Guizhou during the Yongzheng reign, the end of the empire building process in
the southwest proved to be just as violent, if not more so, than what transpired
in Kham at the same time.
Tusi and the Annexation of Kham
Prior to 1715 the towns along the Darzêdo-Lhasa route in the Kham region
of Eastern Tibet were under the nominal authority of officials appointed from
Lhasa. These officials administered the Tibetan postal system, collected taxes,
supervised trade relations between Sichuan and Tibet, and tried, as best they
could, to ensure safe passage for religious pilgrims making their way to and from
Lhasa. But their control over the immense territory of Kham was never entirely
secure. The peoples of this region were (and still are) staunchly independent
folk, rarely compliant to outside forces and pressures. Kangxi’s decision in 1715
to place the young boy many believed to be the true reincarnation of the Sixth
Dalai Lama under Qing protective custody in Xining, and then deploy troops
along the Darzêdo-Lhasa route in Kham, compromised Lhasa’s influence in
Kham, but it probably had little impact on the majority of the people in Kham
who did not live along the Darzêdo-Lhasa route.11
This changed in 1717 with the Zunghar occupation of Lhasa and the death
of Lazang Khan, the expulsion of the Khoshot Mongols out of Central Tibet to
Amdo and Kham, and the ongoing controversy surrounding the reincarnated spirit of the Sixth Dalai Lama.12 Qing control of the Darzêdo-Lhasa route in Kham
was seen as critical in preventing the Zunghars and their allies from advancing
further east to threaten Qing China. In the following year a Manchu garrison
was established in Chengdu, the first of its kind along China’s southwestern
frontier, and in early 1719 the governor-general of Sichuan, Nian Gengyao (d.
1726), ordered Yue Zhongqi (1686–1754) to lead a reconnaissance force into
Kham to bolster a small outpost at Bathang. To increase his odds of making it

Dirks, The Scandal of Empire, 335.
KXSL, 176:7a–b, 201:26a–b, 202:10a–11a, 203:8a, 210:8a; Dai, The Sichuan Frontier, 50–56; Ceng
Xianjiang, “Huxi minzu yu Zang Yi zoulang” (A historical investigation of the nomadic peoples of the
Tibetan-Yi corridor), 110–13.
12
Petech, China and Tibet, 15–24, Dai, The Sichuan Frontier, 76–83; Perdue, China Marches West, 227–32.
10
11
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to Bathang, Yue was given permission to confer tusi titles upon influential local
leaders who swore an oath of allegiance to the Qing throne.13
The most important feature of this tusi title was the patent (gaochi). It listed
the name of the individual upon whom the hereditary tusi title was bestowed,
the title and rank of the tusi post, a description of the geopolitical location of the
tusi domain, the number of households within the tusi domain, and the annual
tax demanded by the Qing state. More often than not, the patent indicated the
Qing state’s commitment to provide the tusi with political and military support,
and preferential access to Chinese merchants and lucrative Chinese markets.
So that Qing support for the tusi was clear, the written script used by the tusi, if
one existed, was to be engraved next to the Chinese characters on the imperial
patent.14 In addition, the Qing-issued tally (fu) instructed the tusi to carry out
a specific task, like patrol a portion of the Darzêdo-Lhasa route, and he could
use the tally and seal (yinzhang) to requisition men and material to carry out
this task. The patent and tally also authorized the tusi to lead a tribute mission
to the Qing capital once every three years, though he was usually directed to
present tribute to officials in the nearest provincial capital. In short, when an
indigenous leader accepted Qing tusi status, he not only became a subject of the
Qing emperor, and by extension an official of the Qing state, but also a critical
instrument in the Qing empire-building process.
As Yue Zhongqi noted, history had shown how the Ming state used the tusi
office at the end of the fourteenth century to increase its influence among the
non–Han Chinese peoples in the southwestern frontier, and now at the beginning
of the eighteenth century this vast area, consisting of the provinces of Yunnan
and Guizhou, was an unquestioned part of China. More recently, in 1702 fortynine tusi titles were bestowed upon local leaders living near the border town
of Darzêdo, and Yue now claimed in 1719 that every one of these forty-nine
tusi had turned undeniably toward Qing China.15 Yue knew that even if he met
resistance along the Darzêdo-Lhasa route he could entice the less powerful and
marginalized communities to submit in order to acquire the status and protection
the Qing state offered. The tusi office was a powerful weapon and Yue used
it to his advantage. After he reached Bathang Yue reported that a multitude of

KXSL, 273:23a–b, 277:4a–b, 279:7a–8b, 280:12b–13b, 283:17a–18a, 284:19a–20a; SCTZ, 13:2a–3b,
95:6a–7b; QSLZ, 17:1249–56. From 1718 to 1721 Nian Gengyao was the governor-general of Sichuan. From
1721 to 1725 he was the governor-general of Sichuan and Shaanxi.
14
Tusi titles and ranks varied depending on the geographic and demographic size of the indigenous leader’s
domain. She Yize, Zhongguo tusi zhidu (China’s tusi institution), 21–23; Gong Yin, Zhongguo tusi zhidu
(China’s tusi insitution), 68–71.
15
SCTZ, 97:33a–41b; Ceng Xianjiang, “Huxi minzu yu Zang,” 109–111.
13
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tusi officials now lined the route between Darzêdo and Bathang, and that Qing
troops could now travel from Darzêdo to Bathang without concern.16
When the Qing launched its two-pronged campaign on Zunghar-controlled
Lhasa in 1720, Nian supervised the Sichuan assault force that marched along
the Darzêdo-Lhasa route, aided in large measure by the tusi Yue had anointed
months earlier. Kangxi’s fourteenth son, Yinti (1688–1753), commanded the
Qing force that departed Xining for Lhasa.17 The Sichuan force reached Lhasa
a few weeks before Yinti’s army, and the speed in which it reached Lhasa so
impressed Kangxi that he ordered Qing forces to return to China by way of the
Darzêdo-Lhasa route. In the wake of this withdrawal from Lhasa, Nian recommended sixty-six transport stations be established along the route and that tusi be
appointed to manage each station. Nian intimated that Qing forces might need to
return to Lhasa at a later date, and these tusi-controlled stations in Kham would
guarantee a modest Qing presence in Kham. Kangxi agreed. Almost immediately
a vigorous debate ensued as to which province, Sichuan or Yunnan, should assume jurisdictional authority over the towns of Darzêdo, Lithang, and Bathang,
a clear indication the Qing was determined to preserve its presence in Kham.18
Nian waited only three months after Kangxi’s death in December 1722 to
submit his recommendation to annex Kham from Tibetan control. Nian’s new
sovereign, Yongzheng, was quite familiar with Nian’s record of service in
Sichuan, and his rescript to Nian’s memorial admits to being intrigued by this
proposal, but Yongzheng cautioned Nian that the time was not right for such a
bold plan. Yongzheng agreed with Nian’s recommendation that tusi remain in
charge of the sixty-six stations and that Qing military outposts be permanently
established in the major towns of Chamdo, Bathang, Lithang, and Darzêdo.
Moreover, these Qing outposts and tusi officials, Nian urged, should assume
control over the Tibetan postal service, a proposal Yongzheng did not object to.
Nian noted that Kham was rife with warfare, and its centuries-old reputation
for banditry and violence was well deserved. Nian recalled Ming policy toward
Yunnan and Guizhou as a cautionary lesson: “Bringing civilian rule to Dian
(Yunnan) and Qian (Guizhou) consumed the energies of Ming officials from
beginning [of the dynasty] to end [of the dynasty].”19 Unlike what confronted
the Ming in the southwest, there were no powerful autonomous kingdoms in
Kham, and the notion of centralized Tibetan rule emanating from Lhasa had
all but evaporated following the Zunghar occupation of Lhasa in 1717. Except
KXSL, 279:7a–8b, 280:12b–13b, 281:19b–20a, 283:17a–18a, 284:19a–20a; GZDZZ, 1288.3, 1288.5.
KXSL, 282:10b–11a; 284:19a–20a, 285:14b–15a; Petech, China and Tibet, 38–55.
18
KSXL, 287:14a–b, 19a–20b, 289:13b–20b; SCTZ, 192:9b–14b; Ceng Xianjiang, “Huxi minzu yu Zang,”
118–21.
19
GZDZZ, 1290.5.
16
17
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for several large lamaseries, Kham was littered with small political entities,
many of which were intensely hostile to one another. Nian believed the reward
of tusi status could be used to manipulate local rivalries, punish recalcitrant local leaders, and ultimately assert Qing control over the people and territory of
Kham. In recalling an earlier conversation he had had with Yue, Nian remarked,
“several minor tusi offices are much easier to control than two or three large
and powerful tusi, so it is to our advantage to confer tusi titles upon as many
[local leaders] as possible, regardless of their power.”20
In all likelihood Yongzheng discussed Nian’s memorial with his advisors before ordering the withdrawal of the Manchu garrison from Lhasa in April 1723,
a decision unpopular with Nian, Yue, and many other Qing military commanders
in the western theatre. Yongzheng knew all too well, however, that his father’s
military campaigns into Tibet and Central Eurasia had been very expensive,
and to continue such military operations would require far more revenue than
was at hand. The emperor repeatedly mentioned that the cost of maintaining a
Qing garrison in Lhasa weighed heavily on him, and this was one of the reasons
given for closing the garrison in Lhasa. As Perdue indicates, this decision to
withdraw the Qing garrison from Lhasa was part of an unprecedented “program
of domestic austerity and institutional reform” implemented throughout China.21
This decision did not undermine Nian’s plan for Kham, since the emperor
redeployed 1,000 troops from the Lhasa garrison to a new outpost in Chamdo.
Even though this outpost in Chamdo seemed in doubt four weeks later when
Yongzheng abruptly withdrew all Qing forces to points east of Lithang, the
emperor was not backing away from the general thrust of Nian’s memorial,
which was to confer tusi status upon indigenous leaders in Kham. He said as
much in one of his remarks interspersed among the lines of Nian’s memorial:
“With support from tusi our military units can maintain a presence in this area.”22
Nevertheless, several officials stationed in the western frontier felt compelled
by this sudden and unexpected retreat from Lhasa to voice their concern about
Yongzheng’s new approach toward Tibet and Kham. Yue Zhongqi, one of the
more respected officials in this theatre, sent a number of memorials to the capital
that contained transcribed appeals from local leaders imploring the throne to
maintain a military presence in Kham.23
For example, in one memorial Yue included an appeal from a local leader
from the Derge area of Kham named Danbaze. Danbaze’s plea dispensed with
20
21
22
23

GZDZZ, 1290.5; SCTZ, 153:5a–b.
Perdue, China Marches West, 241.
GZDZZ, 1290.5. See also, YZSL, 5:2b–5a; GZDYZZZ, 1:105–06.
GZDZZ, 1291.5, 1293.1, 1293.11, 1345.1; YZSL, 3:31b–32a, 3:49a–50b, 5:2b–5a.
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the usual formality one sees in Qing memorials and cautioned Yongzheng that
a withdrawal of Qing forces from Kham would embolden the Khoshot Mongols, who felt betrayed by the Qing, to attack those in Amdo and Kham who
sided with the Qing. Khoshot Mongols from Kokonor had recently sent reconnaissance patrols into Derge territory, and Danbaze warned they were plotting
to attack the western half of Kham, from Chamdo and Derge in the north to
Bathang and Lithang in the south. Moreover, Danbaze noted that many of the
lamaseries in Kham were sympathetic to the Khoshot’s anti-Qing message and
were mobilizing their substantial resources to aid the Khoshots. A withdrawal
of Qing forces from Derge, Danbaze warned, would end badly for those indigenous leaders like himself who were subjects of the Qing emperor. Instead of
jeopardizing the long-term stability of Kham by withdrawing Qing forces from
the region, Danbaze recommended that the Qing bestow even more tusi titles
upon indigenous leaders.24
Ever since 1640, when the Khoshot leader Gusri Khan (1582–1655) answered
the Fifth Dalai Lama’s request for military assistance, the Khoshot had enjoyed
the unique position as protector of the Holy See in Lhasa and upholders of the
Buddhist faith in Tibet. In 1717 the Khoshots were unable to protect Lhasa
from the Zunghars, yet they still wielded considerable influence in central and
eastern Tibet, as evidenced by Kangxi’s request in 1720 for Khoshot assistance
in the Qing campaign to Lhasa. From information available to us now it is clear
Danbaze was referring to the expanding influence of Lobzang Danjin, grandson
of Gusri Khan and leader of the Khoshots. Historians have long debated whether
or not Lobzang Danjin instigated an anti-Qing revolt in 1723, noting that Lobzang Danjin and the Khoshots were never formally allied with the Qing and
still operated autonomous of Qing influence in Kokonor. However, it is clear
from Danbaze’s account that monasteries in Kham were reacting favorably to
the Khoshot’s anti-Qing message, and that Qing influence in Kham was under
assault. It is entirely plausible that the information Yongzheng received from
his field commanders in Sichuan and Kham at this time convinced him to strike
against Lobzang Danjin and the Khoshots in Kokonor. To do so would eliminate
the Khoshot threat in the region and extend Qing influence into the Kokonor
region, and it would undermine the anti-Qing elements in northern Kham.25
Thus, shortly after receiving Danbaze’s report Yongzheng ordered Yue
Zhongqi to lead 2,000 troops north from Darzêdo to Derge, where Danbaze
GZDZZ, 1291.5; GZDYZZZ, 2:343–44.
GZDZZ, 1292.1, 1293.10; Satō, “Lobzan Danjin no hanlan ni tsuite” (On Lobzan Danjin’s revolt),
383–423; Kato, “Lobzang Danjin’s Rebellion of 1723: With a Focus on the Eve of the Rebellion,” 57–80;
Ceng Xianjiang, “Huxi minzu yu Zang,” 126–131.
24
25
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was located, to confront the Khoshots. Moreover, Yunnan Provincial Military
Commander He Yulin was directed to position 1,000 men between the towns
of Bathang and Chamdo on the Darzêdo-Lhasa route to provide logistical
support for Yue’s assault. Both Yue and He were authorized to demand that
all indigenous leaders they encountered in their respective operations pledge
allegiance to the Qing throne. Those who did were granted a tusi title and a
promise of immediate financial and military support; those who did not were
to be threatened with immediate elimination. By spring 1724 Qing forces had
crushed Lobzang Danjin’s revolt, and following Yue’s famous campaign into
the Chadamu Valley to put down another revolt by Tibetans and Khoshots, the
Kokonor region (present-day Qinghai and Gansu) was incorporated into the
Qing Empire.26
In his last significant contribution to Qing frontier policy, Nian submitted a
lengthy memorial in June 1724 outlining his recommendations for the reconstruction of the Kokonor and Kham regions. With respect to Kham, Nian proposed an ambitious military-civilian colonization program. Qing forces stationed
along the Darzêdo-Lhasa route were to be increased substantially. Nian wanted
2,000 troops stationed near Darzêdo, 500 soldiers near where the Yalong River
and the highway intersect, 1,200 troops stationed in Lithang, 500 soldiers in
the Cluo area between Lithang and Bathang where the indigenous population
had been particularly defiant of Qing overtures, and 500 soldiers in Bathang.
To support this large military footprint, Nian wanted the families of the Qing
soldiers to relocate permanently to Kham to reclaim land (kaiken) and provide
for the troops. He also proposed that criminals from Shanxi, Shaanxi, Shandong,
Zhili, and Henan be sent to Kham to reclaim land for the military colonies.27
Next, Qing commanders should continue the policy of granting tusi titles
to win over as many indigenous leaders as possible. Nian’s plan focused not
on granting tusi status to a few powerful leaders, which had been the trend up
to this point in time; instead, he advocated granting minor-level tusi titles to a
large number of indigenous leaders as the best way to ensure no one indigenous
leader could organize a large following to challenge Qing control. “Kham
should be littered with tusi who are wary of one another but dependent upon
[us].” Moreover, “by bestowing tusi offices to local leaders, we will awe (wei)
the people with our magnanimity and extend our influence into this troubled
region without much sacrifice on our part.”28 The tusi title was the instrument
to induce individual local leaders to “turn to China,” and for this reason Nian
wanted Qing to aggressively expand the scope of the tusi program.
26
27
28

GZDZZ, 1292.1, 1293.6, 1293.10; YZSL, 12:2a–5a, 20:26b–29a; Perdue, China Marches West, 243–47.
YZSL, 20:33b–35b; SCTZ, 13:11a–12a, 192:9b–14b; Feng Erkang, Yongzheng zhuan, 323–26.
YZSL, 20:27a.
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In what was certainly his most controversial recommendation, Nian argued
for strict limitations on the size and activities of all lamaseries in Kham. He
noted it was in the lamaseries that one could find a palpable anti-Qing sentiment.
Lamaseries owned the best land, they had the most livestock, they had the largest
concentration of people, and they were the least susceptible to the enticement
of the tusi title. Specifically, Nian wanted each lamasery to sign an agreement
with the Qing state stipulating that no more than 300 lamas could reside in a
lamasery at any one time, and that Qing officials be allowed to conduct biannual
inspections of each lamasery. All grain harvested on lamasery property should
be turned over to Qing officials, and the state should assume responsibility for
providing grain to each lamasery. Furthermore, lamaseries should be denied the
right to tax the local population living near lamasery lands, because taxation
was the sole right of the Qing government. Nian noted, “If the lamasery refused
to agree to these terms, it should be destroyed.”29 With these measures in place,
“it is only a matter of time before this region is firmly under [Qing] control.”30
In May 1725, Nian Gengyao was transferred to Hangzhou and the post of
Governor-General of Shaanxi and Sichuan was assigned to Yue Zhongqi, but
Qing policy toward Kham did not fundamentally change. A few months later
Yue submitted his own plan for Kham, a plan that owed much to Nian’s original
1724 blueprint. The time was right, Yue believed, for the emperor to notify the
Dalai Lama of the Qing emperor’s intention to take possession of Kham. The
current tusi in Kham had, for the most part, proven themselves trustworthy
subjects of the Qing, and now military commanders stationed throughout Kham
reported that minor tribal leaders were flocking to Qing outposts requesting tusi
status. “The people [of Kham],” Yue wrote, “were turning [to Qing rule], so it
was only appropriate to extend the emperor’s grace to these new subjects.”31
Yue recommended three trusted officials, Oci, Bandi, and Zhou Ying, be permitted to lead a survey team to the extreme western edge of historic Kham to
determine the new Qing boundary with Tibet. The normally demonstrative
emperor simply wrote, “Noted” (zhidao liao) at the end of Yue’s memorial
and ordered the memorial sent to the Deliberative Council for discussion. The
Deliberative Council agreed with Yue’s proposal and recommended an edict
be sent immediately to the Dalai Lama informing him of Beijing’s decision to
take possession of Kham.32
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If the Dalai Lama entertained thoughts of once again asserting control over
Kham, the arrival of Yongzheng’s edict most certainly dashed any such hopes.
The Dalai Lama also learned that Yongzheng had decided to curtail the influence
of the Nyingma sect in Kham. Qing field commanders had waged a number of
battles against Nyingma lamaseries, and Yongzheng was determined to eradicate
the sect’s ability to support anti-Qing activities in Kham. The Qing seizure of
Tibetan land and the persecution of the Nyingma sect within Kham were acts
opposed in Lhasa. Even pro-Qing ministers in Lhasa objected to Yongzheng’s
decrees. But before any organized resistance to Qing plans for Kham could
develop, opponents of Beijing’s erstwhile supporters gathered in Lhasa and
murdered Kancennas on August 5, 1727. 33 The repercussion of Kancennas’s
murder was Tibet’s irrevocable slide into another prolonged period of instability.
Yongzheng’s earlier decision to withdraw the Manchu garrison from Lhasa
placed even more responsibility on his officials in Kham and Kokonor to provide information on the events taking place in Lhasa. Yue Zhongqi immediately
requested permission to send Qing forces to Lhasa, but Yongzheng responded
by cautioning that even though the situation in Lhasa looked serious, it would
be prudent to first station a small, highly mobile reaction force in Chamdo
(stationing troops in Chamdo was part of the original plan in 1721 but Yongzheng abandoned this plan shortly thereafter). Yue could then dispatch patrols
from Chamdo into Central Tibet to gather additional information about Lhasa.
“If the situation warrants,” Yongzheng added, “we can then launch a full-scale
assault on Lhasa, but we need to make sure our information is accurate before
taking such action.”34 Yongzheng then concluded his rescript to Yue’s memorial by ordering Yue and Acting Governor-General of Yunnan and Guizhou,
Ortai (1685–1745), to deploy Qing forces from Yunnan and Guizhou along the
Darzêdo-Lhasa route.
Evidently the August 1727 events in Lhasa convinced Qing officials not only
to increase Qing troop strength throughout Kham in anticipation of another attack
on Lhasa, but also to announce the creation of a new border separating Qing
China and Tibet. Stone pillars marked the new border that ran roughly along a
north-south axis through Bathang north toward Derge, closely approximating the
traditional Tibetan division separating Central and Eastern Tibet (Kham).35 Yue
and Ortai immediately praised the emperor’s decisiveness in creating the new
boundary and claimed the decision would bring lasting peace to this troubled
GZDZZ, 1291.3, 1293.1, 1293.6; 1293.10; Petech, China and Tibet, 108–15. Kancennas (Ch. Kangjinai)
had mobilized Tibetan guerrilla forces to resist the Zunghar occupation of Tibet, and following the arrival
of Qing forces in 1720 he was considered an ally of Beijing. Perdue, China Marches West, 236–7, 249.
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region. Unlike the situation in 1696 when Qing and Tibetan officials cooperated
to establish the boundary separating Tibet and China near Darzêdo, Lhasa was
not consulted on the creation of this new boundary.
Beijing moved quickly to incorporate Kham into Sichuan province by
making it a part of Yazhou prefecture, however few Chinese volunteered to
reside in the former Kham territory. Military colonists and military units were
deployed in the region, and Chinese merchants from Sichuan and Yunnan took
advantage of the Qing military presence to resume trade links between China
and Tibet, but for the most part these people were not permanent residents.
Moreover, Chinese civilian officials appointed to Yazhou rarely travelled west
to Darzêdo, and even fewer dared venture into the former Kham region. Qing
military officials and tusi governed Kham, and Beijing continued to encourage
its officials to bestow tusi titles upon sympathetic local leaders. In 1728 the
Qing extended formal recognition to fifty-four tusi in Kham, many of whom
were classified as high-ranking tusi with the right to bestow minor tusi titles,
like tumu (tribal leader), to subordinates; thus, the total number of tusi officials
in Kham at this time was considerably more than fifty-four. This practice of
allowing high-ranking tusi to grant minor tusi titles continued throughout the
Yongzheng and Qianlong reigns. One source estimates that by the beginning of
the nineteenth century there were approximately 350 tusi officials in the Kham
area of Yazhou Prefecture.36
In 1715 the Zunghar Mongol assault on the oasis town of Hami signaled an
escalation in the growing conflict over control of Tibet. Since 1705 the Khoshot Mongol leader Lazang Khan had relied increasingly on Qing support to
impose Khoshot rule in Lhasa, much to the dismay of the Zunghars. In 1717
the Zunghars attacked Lhasa and drove the Khoshots out of Central Tibet, with
many settling in the Amdo-Kham regions of Eastern Tibet. Kangxi responded by
mobilizing Qing forces along China’s entire western frontier and by preparing
for the eventual 1720 invasion of Tibet that would dislodge the Zunghars from
Lhasa. The Zunghars were not defeated in 1720 nor were their allies in Tibet
entirely eliminated; they remained to be dealt with at a later date.
In anticipation of its 1720 campaign on Lhasa, representatives of the Qing
state recognized the need to secure multiple transportation routes between
China and Tibet. The quickest route, though not necessarily the safest route
in 1717 was the Darzêdo-Lhasa route that ran west from the Tibetan-Chinese
border town of Darzêdo through the Kham region of Eastern Tibet toward
Lhasa. Kangxi immediately authorized his officials in Sichuan to bestow tusi
36
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titles upon Kham’s indigenous elite in order to extend Qing influence into this
region. The economic and military strength of Qing China overshadowed its
rivals in the region, and this strength allowed it to convince many of Kham’s
indigenous leaders to accept the terms associated with the tusi title. Within ten
years Beijing announced its annexation of Kham with a boundary that merged
the region with Sichuan province, and Yongzheng launched a policy designed
to alter the political, economic, and religious life in Kham. By the end of 1728
Qing forces were in firm control of Lhasa, and they had escorted the Dalai
Lama back to his birthplace in Kham (Lithang), where he remained for the next
six years under Qing “protective custody.” With Lhasa and Kham under Qing
control, in 1729 Yongzheng began financial and military preparations for an
ambitious campaign against the Zunghar empire, a campaign that would take
several decades and another emperor to complete.
Copper and the Elimination of Tusi in Yunnan
As Qing officials bestowed tusi titles upon Kham’s indigenous leaders to
gain a foothold in Tibetan territory, many of these same officials were equally
aggressive in eliminating existing tusi offices in Yunnan in order to centralize
civilian control over this internal frontier. The vast majority of tusi in Yunnan
traced their hereditary status back to the last decades of the fourteenth century,
when the Ming state established tusi offices in order to extend its influence
into this frontier region, using methods similar those used by the Qing state in
Kham.37 In 1715 only a fraction of the approximately 1,600 tusi offices established during the Ming remained. Many were eliminated during the sixteenth
century as Han Chinese settlers colonized the region and civilian institutions
replaced hereditary tusi offices, but following the end of Wu Sangui’s rebellion
in 1681 Kangxi demanded that his officials posted to the southwest follow a
laissez-faire policy toward tusi, and he often publicly chastised officials who
sought to curb tusi authority.38
Since the remaining tusi were located mostly in remote highlands far from
Han Chinese settlements that now dominated the fertile lowlands, Qing officials
had little difficulty obeying Kangxi’s laissez-faire policy. In 1715, however,
a large percentage of the copper and timber deposits Beijing now required to
mint bronze coin were located in several of the more remote tusi jurisdictions.39
Throughout its 276-year history the Ming state conferred 1,608 tusi titles: 960 were military-rank tusi
titles and 648 civilian-rank tusi titles. In Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan alone, the Ming state bestowed 1,021
tusi titles, or 63 percent of all tusi titles issued during the Ming. Gong Yin, Zhongguo tusi zhidu, 57–63.
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As Qing officials sought to acquire these copper deposits, they quickly found
themselves in conflict with Kangxi’s laissez-faire policy and with tusi who
jealously guarded their lands and natural resources.
Shortly after ascending the Qing throne in 1723, Yongzheng issued an edict
in which he officially reversed his father’s laissez-faire policy toward tusi in
the southwest:
It has come to my attention that tusi in the southwest provinces fail to
abide by our laws and regulations. These tusi often make excuses to
tax and demand excessive labor service from the people under their
control. Compared to the tax demands levied on our subjects, the
indigenes (tumin) pay a much higher tax, even to the extent that their
horses and cattle have been confiscated and their sons and daughters
taken from their homes. They are literally at the mercy of their tusi.
The indigenes are being butchered and they are angry, yet they dare
not speak out against their tusi.40
Yongzheng argued that the tusi in the southwest acted this way in part because
they had come under the influence of treacherous Han Chinese (Hanjian)— Han
Chinese who Yongzheng described as having either committed crimes in China
then escaped justice by fleeing to tusi-governed areas, or Han Chinese who
simply refused to submit to Manchu rule. Yongzheng concluded his edict with
a call for provincial officials to eliminate tusi who refused to abide by Chinese
laws, failed to govern the people fairly and with compassion, and harbored
treacherous Han Chinese. In effect, this imperial edict changed the negotiated
agreement between the Chinese state and tusi in the southwest by demanding tusi
accept Chinese law and Chinese cultural norms in governing their jurisdictions.
When Yongzheng appointed Ortai to the post of Governor-General of Yunnan
and Guizhou late in the winter of 1725, he instructed Ortai to deal forcefully
with recalcitrant tusi, and when possible replace tusi rule with direct Chinese
civilian institutions, seize control of the region’s valuable natural resources, such
as copper, lead, salt, and timber, and streamline the provincial administrations
of these two provinces to hold subordinate officials accountable for remitting
taxes to provincial authorities.41 In 1725, Yunnan’s wealth in copper was well
known to virtually everyone in Qing China. In the immediate aftermath of Wu
Sangui’s rebellion, Cai Yurong (1633–99) rapidly increased both copper and
YZSL, 20:17b–18a.
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salt production in Yunnan in order to offset costs associated with the Qing military occupation of the southwest.42 Cai had proven so successful in developing
Yunnan’s copper industry that in 1705 the Qing state moved to monopolize
the market price of copper in Yunnan, not so much to use Yunnan’s copper in
China’s mints but to effectively control this new source of wealth.
Investors who had flocked to Yunnan in the 1680s and 90s to open copper
mines and smelting operations, however, now fled the region as the government’s new policy to control the market price of copper undermined their ability
to make a profit. By 1710 mines and mints in Yunnan were closing and copper
production had declined from approximately 2 million jin a year in 1690 to less
than half a million jin by 1715.43 Because copper production in Yunnan prior
to 1715 was used almost exclusively to develop the regional economy of the
southwest, this decline in production after 1705 had little effect on Beijing’s two
mints as they relied exclusively on shipments of Japanese copper to produce
coin. Japan’s decision in 1715 to limit copper exports to China compelled the
Qing government to turn to the mines in Yunnan to meet its demand for copper.
Ortai prepared meticulously for this assignment. He was granted access
to confidential reports written by current and former officials posted to the
southwest, he interviewed officials who had been posted to the southwest, and
most important, he had several meetings with Yongzheng, so he was clear as to
what his sovereign expected. Ortai knew where the richest copper mines were
located, Dongchuan prefecture, and he knew Dongchuan was a part of Sichuan,
not Yunnan. Yet Dongchuan was physically much closer to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan and the location of Ortai’s posting, than it was to Chengdu, the
capital of Sichuan.44 Ever since Dongchuan had been added to the Qing realm
as a hybrid civilian-tusi prefecture in 1698, it was Yunnan not Sichuan that
responded to requests for political and military assistance, and Dongchuan’s
tusi visited markets in Yunnan and Guizhou, not Sichuan, to conduct trade. In
fact, direct access from Chengdu to Dongchuan was difficult.
Situated between Chengdu and Dongchuan were two vast internal frontiers
over which the Qing exerted very little control. To the northwest of Dongchuan,
across the Jinsha River, was an area known as Liangshan (Cold Mountain),
whose inhabitants the Chinese called Luoluo. The Liangshan Luoluo were related
culturally to many of the tusi in Dongchuan, and were generally inhospitable
QSLZ, 7:435–40; Yunnan tongzhi, 29.4:11a–56a; Guy, Qing Governors, 331–34; KXSL, 106:18a–b.
Yan Zhongping, Qingdai Yunnan tongzheng kao (Study of copper administration in Yunnan during the
Qing period), 6–8; Ueda, Shinchō shihai to kahei seisaku, 241–46; Qiu Pengsheng, “Shiba shiji Diantong
shichangzhong de guanshang guanxi yu liyi guannian” (Notions of profit and the relations between state and
merchant in the copper market of the 18th century), 70–71.
44
Dongchuan was approximately 400 li from Kunming, but over 2,800 li from Chengdu.
42
43

Collaboration and Resistance on the Southwest Frontier

95

to outsiders. Historically, Han Chinese avoided travelling near this area. To the
northeast of Dongchuan lay the large areas of Wumeng and Zhenxiong, and the
peoples here were also related to the peoples in Dongchuan and Liangshan.45
Han Chinese were slightly more familiar with Wumeng and Zhenxiong, but
only slightly. They knew the area to be heavily forested, sparsely populated, and
rich in agricultural potential. To travel from Chengdu to Dongchuan, an official
would avoid heading directly south into Liangshan, Wumeng, and Zhenxiong.
Instead, he first entered Guizhou, travelled west along the Yunnan-Guizhou
highway, and approached Dongchuan from the south. Ortai sought principally
to extend Qing control over the vast internal frontier rich in copper, timber, and
land where the three provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou came together.
In March 1726, Ortai entered Yunnan travelling west from Guiyang toward
Kunming along the Yunnan-Guizhou highway. He stopped in the small town of
Malong, located directly south of Dongchuan. Much of the copper produced at
the Tangdan factory, the most productive copper factory in Dongchuan, passed
through Malong on its way to mints in Kunming. The officials in Malong reported that much of Dongchuan was still controlled by tusi, but Ortai already
knew this. Two years earlier Ortai’s predecessor, Gao Qizhuo (1676–1738), had
lamented the fact that Han Chinese merchants and miners from Malong, Qujing,
and Kunming had developed the Tangdan copper factory, but were continually
harassed by tusi and tribal leaders (tumu) from Dongchuan and Wumeng. He
observed: “It is truly a lawless area, and Sichuan seems either incapable or
oblivious of the circumstances.”46 “If Dongchuan became a part of Yunnan,”
Ortai noted shortly after his visit to Malong, “the aggrieved can expect redress,
Yunnan troops will pacify the lawless Luoluo, and this savage wilderness will
be transformed into fertile land from which people can reap the abundance.”47
Ortai was well aware the wealth of Dongchuan lay not in the fertile land
itself, but in the minerals under the surface. The Tangdan factory had been in
operation since the Ming period, but it was Cai Yurong’s bold plan to develop
the region’s copper industry in the 1680s that greatly expanded copper mining. Even though the Qing government had decided in 1705 to monopolize the
buying and selling of all copper in Yunnan, which resulted in an abrupt decline
in copper production, Ortai was informed that the current exchange rate in
Malong in 1726 was 1,400 coins per 1 tael of silver. This exchange rate was
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far from the ideal 1,000 coins per 1 tael of silver set by the Qing government,
and it was this way because there was a plentiful supply of coin. In contrast, at
the same time, many other parts of China reported a market price of 750 coins
or less per 1 tael of silver.48 In other words, coin was plentiful in Yunnan, just
not anywhere else. When Ortai departed Malong for Kunming, he knew that in
order to restore vitality to the once vibrant copper industry in Dongchuan he had
to bring not only Dongchuan under direct Qing control, but also the adjacent
areas of Wumeng and Zhenxiong, areas still under tusi control. Once Wumeng
and Zhenxiong were pacified, their timber stands could be exploited for use
in the copper factories, their fertile lands could be reclaimed for agricultural
production, and their roads used to transport copper north from Dongchuan to
ports along the Jinsha River.
Ortai acted quickly. On April 26, one month after he visited Malong, Ortai
requested permission to transfer Dongchuan Prefecture to Yunnan control, even
though this request was made after he had dispatched troops to Tangdan on
the pretext the factory workers required protection from “hostile barbarians.”
His message was clear: Yunnan was better positioned to protect these valuable
copper mines than was Sichuan. Three weeks later on May 17, Yongzheng
concurred.49 With Dongchuan now a part of Yunnan, Ortai turned his attention
to attracting back to Dongchuan the investors who had fled the copper industry
after 1705. According to Ortai,
it is common knowledge there are ample mineral resources here
[Dongchuan]. Copper, gold, and silver, to name just a few, were
exploited here during the Yuan and Ming [periods], but until now we
[Qing] have refrained from developing these deposits. I propose we
offer merchants from Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou the opportunity
to develop Dongchuan’s resources. If merchants need capital to invest, we should provide the initial capital. If this region’s resources
are developed to their full potential, we will reap a financial reward
ten-fold.50
With this announcement, miners, smelters, timber harvesters, transporters,
and land-starved peasants began to flock to Dongchuan in search of work and
wealth, and shortly thereafter these recent arrivals began to push north into
tusi-controlled Wumeng and Zhenxiong. Tensions quickly escalated. It wasn’t
48
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so much the expansion of copper production that militarized the Dongchuan,
Wumeng, and Zhenxiong region, although that certainly played a significant
role; instead, it was the rapid expansion of Ortai’s land reclamation (kaiken)
program that aggravated the tusi and indigenes more than anything. Ortai knew
the development of the copper industry could not proceed until local agricultural production was raised to a level sufficient to support the expansion in the
mining population. Copper production and agricultural production went hand
in hand, and his crash program of opening land to cultivation and large-scale
in-migration of Han Chinese farmers formed part of his overall strategy to
increase copper production.51
In its initial stage, Ortai’s land reclamation program encouraged Qing officials
and merchants to identify productive land neither taxed by the Qing state nor
owned by Han Chinese, and then recommended they “contribute” to Yunnan’s
provincial treasury in exchange for the rights to sell the land to Han settlers.
The recruitment of Han Chinese settlers was critical to Ortai’s plan because he
believed Han farmers were more capable at exploiting productive land than were
non-Han, and more Han farmers residing in the area meant peace and stability
in an increasingly Han Chinese environment. Furthermore, the revenue generated from “contributions” could be used as loans to Han settlers to help them
purchase land from the “contributors” and bring it under cultivation. Once the
land became productive, which Ortai estimated would take five years, title to
the land would be issued to the Han settlers and they could begin paying taxes.
Because such lands were often claimed by tusi, this reclamation program often
resulted in hostilities between settlers and indigenes, and the region quickly
became engulfed in violence.52
Unwilling to tolerate tusi resistance, Ortai put teeth behind Yongzheng’s 1724
edict on tusi, the edict that reversed the Kangxi-era policy of accommodation
toward tusi in the southwest. In one of his many memorials to Yongzheng, Ortai
remarked on how the Ming established tusi to secure its presence in what was
a hostile frontier. In time the Ming replaced tusi offices with civilian officials
and the frontier became more accommodating to the Han. Today Yunnan and
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Guizhou are no longer hostile places, and most of the people living here are
Han. Only in the remote highlands far from Han settlements can we find tusi.
Tusi have outlived their usefulness, and it is only a matter of time before they
completely disappear from the landscape.53
Ortai saw the Ming precedent of eliminating tusi and establishing civilian
rule as part of a long process of historical change, just as Nian Gengyao and Yue
Zhongqi had noted in their memorials to Yongzheng. But where Nian and Yue
saw tusi as an important initial instrument to extend Qing rule in Kham, Ortai
viewed tusi in the southwest as an outdated legacy of Ming imperial expansion
and an embarrassing impediment to civilian rule. In Yunnan and Guizhou, the
Qing was completing what the Ming started.
Local officials in Yunnan and Guizhou immediately recognized the sudden
change in policy and lined up to voice their support for Yongzheng’s (and Ortai’s) aggressive stance toward tusi in the southwest. Wang Yiren, the Guizhou
provincial military commander, reiterated his belief that education was the
best means to bring about the transformation of the indigenes: “Only through
education can the Miao acquire the moral aptitude necessary to become members of a civilized society.”54 Yet Wang added that when tusi refuse to return
to civilization (guihua), flagrantly break the “laws of the land,” and cooperate
with treacherous Han to appropriate tax revenue, then force must be used and
they must be eliminated. In 1726 the acting governor of Guizhou, Shi Liha,
echoed Wang’s sentiments when he wrote, “tusi have outlived their usefulness
in Qian [Guizhou], and the time has come for civilian officials to govern the
entire province. Eliminating the remaining traces of tusi rule should be a priority,
and officials should be given the authority to do so. The final phase [emphasis
added] in bringing Qian into China proper should begin immediately.”55
Ortai relied on Yongzheng’s unwavering support to execute this final phase
and eliminate tusi, yet the scale of Ortai’s actions in the southwest was modest in relation to the geographic size of Yunnan and Guizhou. In Yunnan only
twenty-three tusi offices were eliminated during the Yongzheng reign (1723–35),
and of this number fourteen tusi were abolished in the resource-rich areas of
the Dongchuan, Wumeng, and Zhenxiong region. Of the remaining nine cases,
six were carried out in the wealthy tea-producing areas of Zhenyuan and Puer
in south-central Yunnan. During this same period, only nineteen tusi offices
were eliminated in Guizhou, and most of these tusi were located in northwest
Guizhou, adjacent to Zhenxiong, an area rich in zinc and timber. This did not
53
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represent all of the remaining tusi in Guizhou, but it was close. The process of
Ming imperial expansion in the southwest had nearly run its course. In virtually
every instance the objective was to confiscate resource-rich territory controlled
by tusi and recruit Han Chinese to either “reclaim” land or launch commercial
enterprises to exploit the area’s natural resources.56 With respect to Dongchuan,
Wumeng, and Zhenxiong, the price paid by the indigenes to satisfy Beijing’s
demand for copper was exceedingly high.
In the same April 26, 1726, memorial in which Ortai requested Dongchuan
be made a permanent part of Yunnan, he also informed Yongzheng that he
had ordered the Dongchuan prefect, Huang Shijie, to dispatch scout units into
southern Wumeng to assess the military capability of Lu Wanzhong, the fifteenyear-old tusi of Wumeng. Huang’s troops were given two additional tasks: to
meet with as many tribal leaders (tumu) as possible in hopes of using economic
incentives to turn them against Lu Wanzhong, and to hunt down and capture Lu
Dingkun, the tusi’s charismatic uncle. Upon his brother’s death, Lu Dingkun
had tried unsuccessfully to seize the tusi title for himself, thinking his young
nephew ill-prepared to manage the affairs of the tusi office.57 The indigenous
elite (the Lu patriclan and various tribal leaders) in Wumeng, however, rallied
to support Lu Wanzhong’s claim to the tusi office, forcing Lu Dingkun and a
band of approximately 2,000 warriors to flee south near the Dongchuan-Wumeng
border, where they attacked Han settlers, rustled livestock, and kidnapped Han
working in and near the copper mines of Tangdan. It was Lu Dingkun whom
the people of Dongchuan feared most, and Ortai sensed this when he visited
Malong a few weeks earlier.58
According to one of Huang’s field reports, many of the tumu in Wumeng also
lived in fear of Lu Dingkun, and they willingly agreed to assist Qing efforts to
capture him. Aware that his safety in southern Wumeng was now threatened,
Lu Dingkun attempted to flee across the Jinsha River into Liangshan, which he
knew Qing forces would not dare enter. But before he could reach the Jinsha
River he was intercepted by a militia force and convinced to first meet with
Qing officials to see if a truce could be negotiated. When word reached Huang
Li Shiyu, “Luelun tusi zhidu yu gaitu guiliu” (A brief discussion of the native official [tusi] institution
and bureaucratic consolidation), 273–301; Smith, “Ch’ing Policy,” 155–173; Giersch, Asian Borderlands,
43–62; Weinstein, Empire and Identity, 43–57. By 1750 there were only fifty-three tusi in Guizhou, down
from the estimated 128 tusi in Guizhou at the beginning of the Qing.
57
YZZPYZ, 5:98–100; YZSL, 42:14b, 55:15a–16a; Dongchuan fuzhi, 8:5b–14a; DYLZ, 582–83. According
to Huang’s report, the Wumeng tusi commanded a force no greater than 10,000 troops, half of whom were
mounted cavalry. Their weapons were primitive, mostly swords and bows and arrows. They possessed a
handful of firearms and only two cannon. YZZPYZ, 5:99.
58
According to a memorial by Yue Zhongqi, Lu Dingkun had committed over 30 crimes against the people
of Dongchuan, and Lu Wanzhong had failed to stop him. YZZPYZ, 5:93; YZSL, 55:15a–16a.
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Shijie that Lu Dingkun was contemplating surrender, he hurriedly arranged to
meet with Lu Dingkun, after which the two men “swore a blood oath of brotherhood.” On the following day, Huang escorted Lu Dingkun and his two sons,
Lu Wanfu and Lu Wangui, to Dongchuan, where they met with Liu Qiyuan, the
Dongchuan regional commander (zongbing), and waited for Ortai’s instructions.
Impressed by Lu Dingkun’s willingness to assist the Qing against his nephew
in Wumeng, Liu Qiyuan appointed Lu assistant brigade commander (shoubei),
and agreed to be the godfather to Lu’s two sons.59
When notified of Lu Dingkun’s presence in Dongchuan, Ortai, who was
traveling between Guizhou and Yunnan, altered his itinerary to meet this Luoluo
rebel in Dongchuan. Like Huang and Liu before him, Ortai was impressed by
Lu’s offer to assist the Qing to eliminate the Wumeng tusi; so much so that
Ortai changed Lu Dingkun’s appointment from assistant brigade commander
to the hereditary post of native assistant brigade commander (tu shoubei). During their meeting, Lu Dingkun reported that the real authority in Wumeng was
not the young tusi Lu Wanzhong, but an elderly Han Chinese man named Liu
Jianlong. Liu had lived in Wumeng for many years and was a close advisor to Lu
Wanzhong’s recently deceased father, Lu Dingkun’s brother. Liu had groomed
the young Lu Wanzhong since birth, and now wielded considerable influence
over both the tusi and his family. In fact, Lu Dingkun believed his nephew had
already fled Wumeng to Zhenxiong, where he stayed as a guest of the tusi Long
Qinghou, whose mother was Lu Wanzhong’s aunt on his father’s side.60
Ortai ordered Lu Dingkun to write a letter to Liu Jianlong to persuade him to
surrender the Wumeng tusi seal to Ortai in Yunnan. Although we do not have Lu
Dingkun’s letter, we do have Liu Jianlong’s reply, and in it Liu firmly rebuffs
Lu Dingkun’s request that he hand over Lu Wanzhong and the Wumeng tusi
seal to Ortai in Yunnan. According to Liu Jianlong’s reply,
Sanguan [Lu Dingkun] wrote to me asking that I persuade Lu Wanzhong to surrender to Dian [Yunnan], and that if he doesn’t surrender
it will in fact be my fault. All territories under heaven belong to the
[Qing] emperor. To surrender to Sichuan or Yunnan, what’s the difference? But Wumeng is part of Sichuan, and a few of the officials
[in Wumeng] are from Sichuan. Moreover, the emperor has written
an edict critical of Lu Dingkun. If I follow Lu Dingkun’s words and
tell Lu Wanzhong to send his seal to Yunnan, then I am promoting
rebellion because I am agreeing to the demands of the emperor’s
59
60

YZZPYZ, 5:59–61; DYLZ, 583–85.
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enemy, so I can’t do this. I may be old and stubborn, but I dare not
ask the tusi to rebel…. Sanguan [Lu Dingkun] does not possess any
land to speak of and he is not attached to any area and office, so he
can move as he sees fit. However, the young Saofu [Lu Wanzhong]
has Sichuan’s seal and as tusi he can’t easily move to another province and set himself up in another official’s territory…. On behalf
of Saofu [Lu Wanzhong], I submitted a report to Sichuan’s official
[Yue Zhongqi] requesting that he abandon plans to eliminate the
Wumeng tusi office. If, however, he [Yue Zhongqi] permits us to
join Yunnan, then we will not hesitate for one minute to make the
overnight journey to cross the river [Niulan River].61

According to Qing regulations tusi officials were prohibited from complying
with such a request, and Liu Jianlong even goes so far as to scold Lu Dingkun
for acting inappropriately. The Wumeng tusi was appointed by the Qing emperor,
who turned over the management of day-to-day affairs to Sichuan authorities in
Chengdu. Neither Lu Dingkun nor Ortai in Yunnan had the authority to dictate
policy toward the Wumeng tusi. As Liu states clearly at the end of his reply,
“if Sichuan officials inform us that we are to take orders from Yunnan, then
we will take orders from Yunnan, but for now we take orders from Sichuan.”62
Unfortunately for Liu, he was not privy to the decisions made by Yongzheng,
Ortai, and Yue Zhongqi regarding the future of the Wumeng tusi: this tusi office
was to be eliminated and the area placed under Yunnan control.
Shortly after Liu Jianlong’s reply reached Dongchuan, Liu Qiyuan led
a contingent of troops across the Niulan River into Wumeng. As the squad
ascended a narrow pass just north of the river, they were attacked. Liu and a
handful of soldiers were able to make their way back across the river to safety,
but an infuriated Ortai immediately ordered provincial forces from Yunnan and
Guizhou to attack Wumeng and Zhenxiong from the south and east. The former
rebel Lu Dingkun was given command of an irregular force made up mostly
of his original warriors and ordered to attack Wumeng, which he did with a
vengeance. Yongzheng also ordered Yue Zhongqi to deploy Sichuan forces to
apprehend anyone attempting to flee into Sichuan. The only avenue of escape
from this Qing encirclement was to cross the Jinsha River into Liangshan to
the west, and many fled in this direction.63
Chen Benming, Zhaotong Yizu shitan, 138–39.
Chen Benming, Zhaotong Yizu shitan, 139.
63
Chen Benming, Zhaotong Yizu shitan, 138–41; YZZPYZ, 5:98–103; YZSL, 55:15a–16a, 59:26a–27a,
81:19b–20a; Dongchuan fuzhi, 6:12a–17b.
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When word reached Zhenxiong that Qing forces were mobilized to eliminate
the Wumeng and Zhenxiong tusi, Lu Wanzhong left Zhenxiong for Sichuan in
hopes of convincing Yue Zhongqi that neither he nor the Zhenxiong tusi Long
Qinghou had done anything wrong. But his entourage was intercepted by Sichuan troops and escorted to Kunming. Shortly thereafter, Long Qinghou fled
Zhenxiong for the nearest Qing brigade (ying) in Sichuan to surrender his office
seal. He too was escorted to Kunming. As word spread that the Wumeng and
Zhenxiong tusi were under arrest in Kunming, resistance began to wane and
within three months approximately 200 tumu had been rounded up and sent to
Kunming to await trial alongside their former tusi.64
In less than a year Ortai had convinced the Qing throne to transfer Dongchuan,
Wumeng, and Zhenxiong from Sichuan to Yunnan control; he eliminated the
two largest tusi in the region, Wumeng and Zhenxiong; he purged the region
of lower-level members of the indigenous elite (tumu) who had been enfeoffed
by the Wumeng and Zhenxiong tusi to govern specific areas within the tusi’s
jurisdiction; and most important, he secured Qing control over the vast copper deposits in Dongchuan and the immense timber stands and fertile land in
Wumeng and Zhenxiong needed to exploit the copper ore. The Qing troops
mobilized for the campaign against Wumeng and Zhenxiong were permanently
deployed to a large fort in Wumeng and two smaller forts in Dongchuan and
Zhenxiong. Nearly 4,000 troops from the Qing fort in Weining (Guizhou) alone
were redeployed to Wumeng. Interspersed between these three forts was a vast
network of smaller outposts situated along roads and mountain trails. Now that
the two tusi officials and much of the local elite were either dead, in Kunming
awaiting trial, or in Liangshan as refugees, these military units became not only
permanent residents but a new landholding elite—local Qing commanders were
charged to carry out land reclamation in their areas.65
The occupation of Dongchuan, Wumeng, and Zhenxiong, the land reclamation program and accompanying influx of Han Chinese settlers, the felling of
vast timber stands to feed the copper factories in Dongchuan, and the impressment of indigenes to work in the copper mines reignited a new round of Luoluo
resistance. At one point in November 1728, the situation became so dire that
when a Sichuan field commander reported he had finally brought “peace” to
northern Wumeng by massacring nearly a thousand rebels at the town of Mitie,
Ortai became ill and bedridden in despair for three days.66 Even Yongzheng
YZZPYZ, 5:110–25. Long Qinghou was subsequently sent to internal exile in Jiangnan, whereas Liu
Jianlong was executed in Kunming. DYLZ, 588.
65
YZZPYZ, 5:121–36; YZSL, 66:10a–12a, 72:22a–b; Chen Benming, Zhaotong Yizu shitan, 139–43.
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expressed discomfort at reading reports of Qing soldiers purposely mutilating
women and children in acts of revenge. The real shock occurred in October
1730 when Luoluo forces secretly surrounded the Qing fort at Wumeng and
slaughtered its Han Chinese inhabitants, including the regional commander,
Liu Qiyuan. When Ortai learned that Lu Dingkun’s two sons had played a role
in organizing Luoluo resistance against the Qing, he tendered his resignation.
Yongzheng refused to accept Ortai’s resignation request, but he did authorize
Ortai to direct a punishing campaign throughout Wumeng and Zhenxiong. By
the summer of 1731, Qing commanders reported that Wumeng and Zhenxiong
were literally devoid of human life: the Luoluo who had massacred Qing soldiers and Han Chinese settlers in 1728 were now themselves “exterminated.”67
In the early months of 1732, Ortai reported Luoluo resistance in Wumeng
and Zhenxiong had been crushed. Qing military units were once again ordered
to settle the area as permanent residents, never to return to their native place,
and civil and military officials were authorized to initiate another massive land
reclamation program. Han Chinese settlers again flooded into the DongchuanWumeng region in search of land and employment. A few months later Ortai
was recalled to Beijing, his work in the southwest complete, his work a success. In one shockingly candid moment during Ortai’s tenure in the southwest,
Yongzheng confided to Ortai: “When I can’t trust myself, I can trust you.”68
Why such praise for an official whose reputation was now tarnished by the
brutal campaigns against the Luoluo? The answer can be summed up in one
word: copper.
At the time of Ortai’s appointment in 1725, the copper mines in Yunnan produced about 1 million jin annually, an amount barely sufficient to meet Yunnan’s
demands. In fact, the year before (1724) the governor of Zhejiang suggested
Hunan and Hubei purchase copper from Yunnan to complete their quota obligations to the mints in Beijing, a request Yunnan was unable to accommodate.69
In 1727, just one year after Ortai assumed his post in Kunming, the mines and
factories in Dongchuan alone produced over 4 million jin of copper, which allowed Yunnan to ship 1 million jin to Hunan and Hubei, and another 1 million
jin to Jiangsu. The copper shipped to Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangsu eventually
made its way to the mints in Beijing, the first time Yunnan copper was used
to mint coin in the Beijing mints.70 In 1730, officials in Guangdong received
YZZPYZ, 5:427–34, 439–47; YZSL, 99:12a–13a, 99:16b–19a; DYLZ, 608–12; QSLZ, 13:1172–74,
15:1346–47; Smith, “Ch’ing Policy,” 164–65; Chen Benming, Zhaotong Yizu shitan, 148.
68
YZZPYZ, vol. 5, 91.
69
Yan Zhongping, Qingdai Yunnan, 11; YZZPYZ, 5:169–70.
70
Yan Zhongping, Qingdai Yunnan, 11–12; Ueda, Shinchō shihai to kahei seisaku, 151–60; Pan Xiangming,
“Qingdai Yunnan de kuangye kaifa” (Development of the mining industry in Yunnan during the Qing period),
333–63.
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permission to purchase Yunnan copper to supply its own provincial mints and
to fulfill its quota obligations to the Beijing mints. When he departed Yunnan
for Beijing in 1732, Ortai declared that Yunnan’s mines and factories were
producing nearly 8 million jin of copper a year, and much of this copper was
transported out of Yunnan to the mints in Beijing.71 And in 1737, just 11 years
after Ortai took up his post in Yunnan, his protégé and current governor-general
of Yunnan and Guizhou, Yengišan (1696–1771), reported Yunnan could now
satisfy all of China’s demands for copper, and it did.72
Several scholars have examined this dramatic increase in copper production
in Yunnan, with perhaps Yan Zhongping’s 1957 study the most authoritative. In
this study Yan analyzed statistical information covering 71 years, from 1740 to
1811, compiled by the Copper Bureau, the government office in Yunnan tasked
with procuring copper from the mines and forwarding it to various mints outside
of Yunnan, including the two mints in Beijing. According to Yan, during these
71 years Yunnan exported approximately 730,330,000 jin of copper, or roughly
10,140,000 jin annually.73 Yan’s data were in large measure confirmed in a
1983 study by Wei Qingyuan, who discovered a memorial written in Qianlong
35 (1771) in the First Historical Archives that detailed the amount of copper
shipped from Yunnan from 1736 to 1770. The 1771 memorial indicated slightly
less copper was exported out of Yunnan than what Yan’s Copper Bureau figures
indicated, but the statistical variation between these two sources is quite small.74
A more recent article by Yang Yuda argues that both Yan and Wei underestimated
the amount of copper produced in Yunnan because neither study accounted for
private copper that remained in Yunnan. Many of the miners and factory managers were paid in copper, and they sold their copper at local markets in exchange
for daily necessities.75 In any case, Hans Ulrich Vogel estimates that from the
time of Ortai’s arrival in Yunnan in 1726 to the middle of the nineteenth century,
the copper produced in Yunnan’s factories allowed the Qing state to mint over
330 million strings (1 string = 1,000 coins), or 330 billion coins.76
Yan Zhongping, Qingdai Yunnan, 12–13; Ueda, Shinchō shihai to kahei seisaku, 177–84; Kawakatsu
“Shin-Kenryūki unnandō no kyōun mondai” (Copper transport from Yunnan to Beijing in the Qianlong
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72
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Conclusion
In 1715 Qing China was forced to respond to two separate international
events, the emerging Zunghar Mongol threat in Central Eurasia and Japan’s
decision to restrict copper exports to China. Kangxi immediately mobilized
Qing forces along China’s western frontier, and following the Zunghars’ invasion of Tibet two years later he utilized the military and economic superiority
of China to confront the Zunghars. One aspect of the Qing response was the
annexation of the Kham region of Eastern Tibet. Qing officials conferred tusi
titles upon members of Kham’s indigenous elite in order to forge a network of
alliances that would eventually “turn” this region away from Lhasa and toward
Beijing. In return the Kham elite swore an oath of loyalty to the Qing throne
and agreed to act on behalf of Qing interests in Kham. The Khoshot Mongol
presence in Amdo and Kham in the 1720s only accelerated the need to transform
the Kham elite into allies of the Qing state. By the end of 1727, the multitude of
tusi officials in Kham and the continued political instability in Lhasa afforded
the Qing state the opportunity to unilaterally seize Kham from Tibet and fold
it into China’s Sichuan province.
Japan’s restrictions on copper exports endangered China’s long-term financial
health because people depended on bronze coin for daily transactional needs. By
1723 copper shortages had become acute. Since large copper deposits existed
on tusi lands in Yunnan, this dilemma folded neatly into the Zunghar strategic
threat to southwest China: a policy of replacing tusi with Chinese civilian institutions would consolidate Qing control over a strategically vulnerable region and
secure desperately needed copper for China’s economy. Qing officials assigned
to Sichuan and Yunnan were therefore tasked to implement simultaneously two
ends of the empire-building process, the initial advance into foreign territory
(Kham) through negotiated alliances (tusi), and closing the empire in Sichuan,
Yunnan, and Guizhou with the elimination of tusi offices and the establishment
of a unified civil administration.
The Qing desire to control the copper deposits in the southwest carried with
it an added element that was not present in its policies toward Kham, the selfserving rhetoric of a civilizing empire. Unlike Kham, which was clearly foreign
territory in 1715, the southwest had been an unquestioned part of China since
at least the fourteenth century, if not before, and by the eighteenth century Han
Chinese settlers had come to inhabit large parts of Yunnan and Guizhou. Nevertheless, the sizable non-Han population and the continued presence of tusi offices
gave the impression of an unfinished empire, a region yet to be incorporated fully
with China. Interestingly Yongzheng and his officials relied not on economic
arguments to justify the seizure of indigene resources, but instead on culturalist
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claims that validated their actions in the name of imparting civilization to the
indigenes. Chinese civilization was the weapon used to motivate Qing officials
into believing their actions, however disconcerting, were necessary to lift the
indigenes out of their crude, uncivilized existence. And finally historians who
believed in the efficacy of Chinese civilization wrote (and still write) admiringly of well-intentioned officials struggling to impart the benefits of Chinese
civilization to the non-Han in the southwest. This was the rhetoric of empire,
and this rhetoric concealed Qing China’s deliberate appropriation of land and
resources in the southwest.
Glossary
Baoquanju		 寶泉局
Baoyuanju 		
寶源局
Bathang 			
巴塘
Cai Yurong 		
蔡毓榮
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叉沐朵
Chengdu 			
成都
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打箭爐
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滇
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gaitu guiliu 		
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高其卓
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